Non-attorney Representation Representing who you wish -
Unjust “practicing law without a license”

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Any denial of Counsel is an attempt to accomplish that which is specifically prohibited by the U.S. and Florida Constitutions. The Right set down therein says nothing about only "court-approved counsel" and is in no way qualified.

The U.S. Supreme Court held, in Miller v Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713, 715, that if a statute is part of an unlawful scheme to reach a prohibited result, " ... the statute must fail..." This was again upheld in McCallen v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 630. Legislators, neither Federal nor State, may restrict the Courts to "attorneys only" in order to effectively deny Counsel to any Defendant who evinces a desire to be represented or assisted by a "friend" in preference to an "attorney." What cannot be done by the front door cannot be lawfully done by way of the back door.

Legislators who pass laws do not have to be attorneys nor do those who execute the law i.e., Sheriffs, Governors, Presidents, etc. Even the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court need not be licensed attorneys. To exclude the People from defending their "friends" in the Courts turns the said Courts into a playground for the legal establishment, and is a blatant violation of the Petitioner's Right to Counsel, due process of law, and equal protection under the law. Mr. Justice Brandeis said:

Discrimination is the act of treating differently two persons or things under like circumstances." Nat'l Life Ins Co. v United States, 277 U.S. 508, 630.

As far back as 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court was concerned with the unjust and illegal discriminations which were running rampant. The Court frowned upon law administered with an "unequal hand."

" ... so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar circumstances material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution." Yick Wo v Hopkins, supra

Therefore, the Courts cannot be the exclusive territory of the legal "elite corps" but must be open to all the Sovereign People alike--on an equal basis.

The Ninth and Tenth Amendments also prohibit the denial of Counsel of choice. Nowhere has the Petitioner or his predecessors delegated such restrictive power to the United States or to the States, and if the Court will closely examine the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, it will find that the Right to Counsel of choice, such as the Petitioner herein claims, is also secured in the penumbra of these Amendments, particularly the Ninth, which is protected in the States (against "practice of law" statutes) by the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v Wade, 41 L.W. 4213 (1973); Shapiro v U.S., 641, 394 US 618 (1966); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1964).

In speaking of controlling Constitutional law as opposed to mere statute law, Chief Justice Marshall said:

"Those then, who controvert this principle, that the Constitution is to be considered, in court as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution and see only the law."

And the Court concluded that:

"This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions" Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 176

The United States Supreme Court also pointed out in this decision that in declaring what should be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself was first mentioned and " ... not the laws of the United States generally..."

The attorneys who sit in our State legislatures and our Congress have no right to pass laws which infringe or abolish our rights under the Constitution of the United States and such unconstitutional laws which purports to do so must be declared null and void (Miranda v Arizona p Supra > p. 491) and not binding upon the Courts.

The Circuit court has made "legal representative" exceptions before...
7C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d s 1956 (R 25)
(WRIGHT & MILLER SUPPLEMENTAL SERVICE)
Federal Practice and Procedure
Criminal, Civil, Jurisdiction and Related Matters, Appellate, Evidence Supplemental Service
February, 2000
Editorial Staff of West Group
Copyright - 2000 by West Group
Chapter 5. Parties
Rule 25. Substitution of Parties

s 1956. DEATH--MECHANICS OF SUBSTITUTION

In a case in which an individual sought certain documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), but died before the litigation was completed, the District of Columbia Circuit, holding that a claim brought under the FOIA may survive the death of the original requestor, remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the deceased requestor's son was the proper party for substitution within the meaning of Rule 25(a). In doing so, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that, although it is generally accepted that the proper party for substitution must be a "legal representative" of the deceased, a proper party need not necessarily be the appointed executor or administrator of the deceased party's estate. Sinito v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, C.A.D.C.1999, 176 F.3d 512, citing Wright, Miller & Kane. FPP s 1956 (R 25)